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Black Codes and Broken Windows:
The Legacy of Racial Hegemony
in Anti-Gang Civil Injunctions
Gary Stewart
[W]e remain imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its influence
in the present.
-Justice William Brennan'
Murder and mayhem are ravaging America's inner-cities. Indeed, members
of neighborhood gangs are holding an alarming number of innocent citizens
"hostages in the 'hood," 2 leaving residents of these communities afraid for
their lives in public spaces.' In response to these terrifying conditions, many
state and local governments have adopted new criminal and civil approaches
designed to abate the "nuisance" of gang existence.4
California has positioned itself at the vanguard of this burgeoning army of
states, deploying powerful new weapons in a war against local gangs for the
urban landscape.5 The escalating social costs of gang activities have brought
emergency measures aimed at resuscitating ailing California communities. 6
Especially prominent-and, as we will see, problematic-among these new
stratagems is the civil injunction aimed at curtailing gang activities.7
1. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan. J., dissenting).
2. Robert A. Destro, The Hostages in the 'Hood, 36 ARIZ L REV. 785 (1994).
3. See Terence R. Boga, Note, Turf Wars: Street Gangs, Local Governments, and the Battle for Public
Space, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 477 (1994).
4. E.g., Christopher S. Yoo, Comment, The Constitutionality of Enjoining Street Gangs as Public
Nuisances, 89 Nw. U. L. REv. 212, 213 n.2, 214 n.3 (1994); see also. e.g., Frank F. Harper. To Kill the
Messenger: The Deflection of Responsibility Through Scapegoating (A Socio-Legal Analysis of Parental
Responsibility Laws and the Urban Gang Family), 8 HARV. BLACKLEI'IER J. 41 (1991).
5. See Boga, supra note 3, at 477.
6. See Alexander A. Molina, Note, California's Anti-Gang Street Terrorism Enforcement and
Prevention Act: One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?, 22 Sw. U. L REv. 457. 459 (1993); see also Harper,
supra note 4, at 48 (noting that in 1991 there were an estimated 50.000 to 70,000 gang members in Los
Angeles County alone).
7. See Boga, supra note 3. at 477; see also Daniel J. Sharfstein, Gangbusters: Enjoining the Boys in
the 'Hood, AM. PROSPECT, May-June 1997. at 58 (analyzing the costs and benefits of California's anti-gang
injunctions). For a general definition of the term "'civil injunction." see Madsen v. Women's Health Center.
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 762 (1994). The Court stated:
An injunction, by its very nature, applies only to a particular group (or individuals) and
regulates the activities, and perhaps the speech, of that group. It does so, however. because of
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More specifically, municipalities are increasingly fighting gangs by
appealing to courts' power to abate nuisances. Judges have responded by
granting sweeping injunctions restraining gang members from fighting, using
gang symbols, possessing weapons, spraying graffiti, trespassing on private
property, and even socializing publicly.8 As Terence Boga notes, "Through the
magic of a judicial order, even purely social association becomes a punishable
offense, subjecting violators to months of incarceration and significant fines.
By means of this civil remedy, cities are effectively banishing street gangs
from the realm of public space." 9
In this Note, I identify modem anti-gang civil injunctions as a legacy of
postbellum vagrancy ordinances. Juxtaposing these two periods, I show that a
significant effect of measures authorizing broad police and judicial discretion
in crime prevention is the domination and control of "undesirable"-but
"innocent"t 0 -minority groups by majority race groups. Utilizing the
prominent psychological theory of aversive racism,' t which analyzes the more
subtle forms of contemporary racism, I argue that differences in the
transparency of racist attitudes and actions do not necessarily reveal differences
in the harmful effects that these attitudes and actions might impose on minority
communities.
More concretely, the California Supreme Court's recent affirmation of
purportedly race-neutral anti-gang civil injunctions threatens to harm minority
communities. 12  Courts have consistently granted municipalities broadly
worded injunctions that threaten to stigmatize innocent minority youth who are
members of the same communities that these courts purport to want to
the group's past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties. The parties
seeking the injunction assert a violation of their rights; the court hearing the action is charged
with fashioning a remedy for a specific deprivation, not with the drafting of a statute addressed
to the general public.
Id.
8. See Boga, supra note 3, at 477.
9. Id.
10. The placement of the term "innocent" in quotation marks is intended to problematize the terms
"innocence" and "guilt" in the context of racial discussions. For a more detailed exploration of the
problematic nature of "innocence," see generally Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, in
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 27 (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds.,
1997).
1I. The theory of aversive racism, proposed by John F. Dovidio and Samuel L. Gaertner, posits that
[c]ontemporary forms of racism are more subtle and indirect than the old-fashioned forms ....
[A]versive racism is an adaptation resulting from an assimilation of an egalitarian value system
with (1) impressions derived from human cognitive mechanisms that contribute to the
development of stereotypes and prejudice, and (2) feelings and beliefs derived from historical
and contemporary cultural racist contexts .... Both the existence of almost unavoidable racial
biases and the desire to be egalitarian form the basis of an ambivalence that aversive racists
experience.
John F. Dovidio et al., Stereotyping, Prejudice and Discrimination: Another Look, in STEREOTYPES AND
STEREOTYPING 276, 288 (C. Neil Macrae et al. eds., 1996) (citations omitted). For a more detailed
discussion of aversive racism, see infra Section III.B.
12. See People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
2250 [Vol. 107: 2249
Black Codes and Broken Windows
protect. 3 Some of these youth might be labeled "associates" of gangs simply
because they belong to racial minorities and share living quarters or public
spaces with street gang members. Others might actively affiliate with street
gang members but lack the specific intent to further a gang's criminal
activities." Either way, anti-gang civil injunctions promise to perpetuate
racial stigma and oppression. Particularly because gang members are popularly
envisioned as lower-class members of racial and ethnic minorities'5 and
because many minority youths romanticize gang culture, 6 communities
genuinely attempting to break down systems of racial oppression cannot afford
anti-gang civil injunctions. Although justified in less overtly racist terms, anti-
gang injunctions share with postbellum vagrancy ordinances a repressive effect
that stamps minority communities with badges of inferiority.
In Part I of this Note, I examine and critique James Q. Wilson and George
L. Kelling's "broken windows" metaphor,' 7 which refers to the people,
entities, and symbols (e.g., homeless people, gangs) that may impinge upon a
community's quality of life and thus symbolize its impending decay. The
"broken windows" argument claims that broad police discretion is necessary
for effective crime prevention, even if such discretion leads to some
infringements on civil rights. I challenge this approach by examining its ability
to grapple with one simple historical lesson: that the provision of broad police
powers might result in both general violations of civil liberties and the specific
oppression of minority communities.
A review of this literature is essential to an examination of anti-gang
injunctions for two reasons. First, the anti-gang injunctive strategy is located
within a larger, renewed call for quality-of-life improvements in American
cities. Second, the "broken windows" literature provides the strongest
contemporary argument for anti-gang injunctions. Thus, an examination of this
literature logically precedes an informed discussion of such injunctions.
In Part II, I review the historical nexus between vagrancy laws and
"undesirable" groups. Under these laws, police and courts were given broad
discretionary powers that were typically used to harass innocent black people.
Although the laws themselves were facially race-neutral, I argue that
13. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 236.
14. For an informed discussion of how levels of gang participation vary, see David S. Rutkowski,
Note, A Coercion Defense for the Street Gang Criminal: Plugging the Moral Gap in Exiung Law. 10
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 137, 149-50 (1996). See generally JOAN w. MOOR. GOING
DOWN TO THE BARRIO: HOMEBOYS AND HOMEGIRLS IN CHANGE (1991) (examining the historical evolution
of two Chicano gangs in the 20th century); Harper, supra note 4. at 49-52 (explaining the various easons
that people join gangs).
15. See MARTIN SANCHEZ JANKOWSKI, ISLANDS IN THE STREET I. 300-02 (1991); Harper. supra note
4, at 52.
16. Examine, for example, the lyrics and mass popularity of gangsta rap, such as 2PAC. ALL EYEZ
ON ME (Death Row Records 1996); and THE NOTORIOUS B.I.G., LIFE AFTER DEATH (Bad Boy Records
1997).
17. James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken lindows: The Police and Neighborhood Safety.
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar. 1982, at 29.
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implementation of these laws was often targeted at minority communities. My
objective in this part (and throughout this Note) is simply to examine the
historical effects of vagrancy laws. I do not address constitutional arguments
beyond their ability to document a historical awareness of these effects.
In Part I, I draw an explicit comparison between vagrancy laws and anti-
gang injunctions, using the theory of aversive racism to explain how ostensible
differences between the two crime-fighting measures are largely illusory.
I. THE DANGER OF BROKEN WINDOWS
The renewed popularity of quality-of-life concerns is primarily the result
of new community and problem-oriented policing philosophies." These
philosophies call for police officers to focus less on battling more serious
crimes and more on "prevalent and low-key troubles" like abandoned
buildings, chronic vandalism, loitering youths, unsafe parks, and gangs.' 9
Noting that "the rise of crime beginning in the 1960s had coalesced with...
[a shift of attention by police officers] away from the quality of life in public
spaces,'2 some scholars and commentators have increasingly demanded new
crime-fighting approaches.
James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling's enormously influential article,
Broken Windows,2' helped to accelerate these demands.22 Indeed, Broken
Windows provided a compelling, almost intuitive prescription for modem
American policing that "powerfully provoked this new attention to quality-of-
life concerns and helped stimulate what became the community policing
movement of the 1980s." 23
Key to Wilson and Kelling's "broken windows" argument is an
observation that "residents of.. . foot-patrolled neighborhoods seem[] to feel
18. For a more detailed discussion of the rise of these policing philosophies, see Debra Livingston,
Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 551, 565-91 (1997).
19. Id. at 578.
20. Id. at 579.
21. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 17.
22. See, e.g., HERMAN GOLDSTEIN, PROBLEM-ORIENTED POLICING 23 (1990) (noting that the "broken
windows" thesis is "widely cited"); WESLEY SKOrAN, DISORDER AND DEcUNE 51-57 (1990) (providing
empirical support for the broken windows argument); William Barr, A Practical Solution to Crime in Our
Communities, I MIcH. L. & POL'Y REv. 393, 396 (1996) (arguing that "the analogy of the broken windows
is perfect," and noting that it explained his experience as Attorney General of the United States from 1991
to 1993); William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement of Quality.of.Lfe
Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL'Y 447 (1995) (demonstrating the author's unabashed support, as the former New
York City Police Commissioner, for the "broken windows" thesis and community policing); Robert C.
Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers, Skid Rows, and Public-Space
Zoning, 105 YALE LJ. 1165, 1171 (citing "[tihe well-known 'broken windows' thesis"); Livingston, supra
note 18, at 583-84 ("In short, Broken Windows ... was 'widely cited,' has become 'one of the most
influential articles on policing,' and has helped to create what some have termed a 'consensus' in
community and problem-oriented policing circles that the neglect of quality-of-life problems was a
deficiency of urban policing in the period into the 1980s.").
23. Livingston, supra note 18, at 578.
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more secure than persons in other areas, tend[] to believe that crime had been
reduced, and seem[] to take fewer steps to protect themselves from crime."2'
Thus, the authors argue, reform era25 police officers who emphasized crime-
fighting should have instead addressed the quality-of-life concerns of the
communities that they policed.'
To illustrate the simple premise of their argument, the authors make a
memorable analogy. They note:
Social psychologists and police officers tend to agree that if a window
in a building is broken and is left unrepaired, all the rest of the
windows will soon be broken. This is as true in nice neighborhoods
as in run-down ones. Window-breaking does not necessarily occur on
a large scale because some areas are inhabited by determined window-
breakers whereas others are populated by window-lovers; rather, one
unrepaired broken window is a signal that no one cares, and so
breaking more windows costs nothing....
We suggest that "untended" behavior also leads to the breakdown
of community controls.27
Addressing arguments critical of vagrancy ordinances, the authors counter
that compassion should not blind us to the blemishes of disadvantaged
communities. In their view, communities should willingly tolerate some
infringement on the civil liberties of undesirable populations in exchange for
the effective crime prevention that broad vagrancy-type laws promise.2 1 They
note, "Arresting a single drunk or a single vagrant who has harmed no
identifiable person seems unjust, and in a sense it is. But failing to do
anything about a score of drunks or a hundred vagrants may destroy an entire
community. ,
2 9
In the same spirit as Wilson and Kelling, Professor Randall Kennedy has
articulated demands for increased police presence in minority communities.
Although not explicitly a call for quality-of-life improvements, Kennedy argues
that
the main problem confronting black communities in the United States
is not excessive policing and invidious punishment but rather a failure
of the state to provide black communities with the equal protection of
the laws .... [W]hat is really at stake ... is not simply an inter-racial
dispute but an actual or incipient intra-racial conflict. Although blacks
subject to relatively heavy punishment for crack possession are
24. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 17, at 29.
25. For a discussion of "reform era" policing, see Livingston. supra note 18. at 565-67.
26. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 17, at 33-34.
27. Id. at 31.
28. See id. at 35.
29. Id. (emphasis added).
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burdened by it, their black law-abiding neighbors are presumably
helped by it .... Although black youngsters who wish to stay out
late are burdened by a curfew, blacks who feel more secure because
of the curfew are benefited. Although black members of violent gangs
are burdened by police crackdowns on such gangs, blacks terrorized
by gangs are aided.30
Central to Kennedy's critique is a self-declared appreciation of the many
different sectors that constitute black communities. 3' This leads Kennedy to
conclude that the disparate racial impacts of crime control policies are perhaps
the result, "not of a white-dominated state apparatus 'discriminating' against
blacks, but instead, of a state apparatus responding sensibly to the desires of
law-abiding people-including the great mass of black communities-for
protection against criminals preying upon them.,
32
The central drawback of the approaches advanced by Wilson, Kelling, and
Kennedy rests in their shared blindness to the potentially harmful impact of
broad police discretion on minority communities. Wilson and Kelling, for
example, admit forthrightly that broad delegations of police power exist
"because [society] wants an officer to have the legal tools to remove
undesirable persons from a neighborhood when informal efforts ... have
failed. 33 Indeed, they even concede that "a commendable desire to see that
people are treated fairly moves us to worry" when someone is arrested for the
"crime" of being undesirable. 4 Though they acknowledge that their approach
to policing lends itself to the police's becoming "the agents of neighborhood
bigotry,"35 they conclude, in effect, that this is an acceptable cost:
We can offer no wholly satisfactory answer to this important question
[of abating police discrimination]. We are not confident that there is
a satisfactory answer, except to hope that by their selection, training,
and supervision, the police will be inculcated with a clear sense of the
outer limit of their discretionary authority.36
This answer is simply not good enough. At best, Wilson and Kelling's
thesis suggests that we might someday want to expand police officers' already
significant discretionary powers. But this expansion should occur only once
police officers have proven that their racial biases do not affect their work.
Only then would an increase in official discretion be justified. The authors
30. Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A Comment, 107 HARV.
L. REV. 1255, 1256, 1273 (1994). Kennedy has since expanded his argument. See RANDALL KENNEDY,
RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW (1997).
31. See Kennedy, supra note 30, at 1274.
32. Id. at 1278.
33. Wilson & Kelling, supra note 17, at 35.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. (emphasis added).
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have done nothing-that is, offered neither empirical data nor normative
arguments-to indicate that such a retreat from the "rule-of-law '"37 approach
is justified.
Like Wilson and Kelling, Kennedy provides no evidence that law
enforcement officials would responsibly exercise increased power.3 Members
of racial minorities are both perpetrators and victims of violent crime. But that
fact in and of itself cannot justify the perpetuation of racial stereotypes that
apply to both the middle-class blacks who, presumably, are not committing
violent crimes, and the stereotypical, low-life ragamuffins who are. As David
Cole explains, "IT]he sheer numbers of black men in prison cannot help but
have negative ripple effects throughout the black community. ' 39 More
specifically, approximately fifty percent of all prison inmates are black.' In
the District of Columbia in 1992, approximately forty percent of black men
were incarcerated; in Baltimore that figure was fifty-six percent.4' Indeed, the
percentage of black men in prison or under some form of correctional
supervision is greater than the percentage in college. 2
Given this contextual reality, and the obvious corollary that many
"criminals" are the friends, parents, and loved ones of inner-city inhabitants,
proposals to write off black "criminals" might perpetuate the depressing
conditions of disadvantaged communities. Cole notes:
Incarceration of so many young black men contributes to the very
problems that are so often pointed to as the source of higher crime
rates in the black community .... By removing so many black men
from the community and stigmatizing them forever with a criminal
conviction, criminal law enforcement is likely to mean more single-
parent families, less adult supervision of children, more unemployed
and unemployable members of the community, more poverty, and in
turn, more drugs, more crime and more violence. This is not to
37. I borrow John Jeffries's definition of "rule of law." He explains:
The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrariness in the exercise of government power...
The evils to be retarded are caprice and whim, the misuse of government power for private
ends, and the unacknowledged reliance on illegitimate criteria of selection. The goals to be
advanced are regularity and evenhandedness in the administration of justice and accountability
in the use of government power.
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L REv. 189.
212 (1985).
38. It is interesting to note, however, that even Kennedy has expressed reservations about the racial
implications of anti-gang injunctions. See Randall Kennedy. Guilty by Association. AM. PROSPECT. May-
June 1997, at 66.
39. David Cole, The Paradox of Race and Crime: A Comment on Randall Kennedy ' "Politics of
Distinction," 83 GEO. LJ. 2547, 2555 (1995).
40. See Fox Butterfield, More in the U.S. Are in Prisons, Report Says, N.Y. TiMEs. Aug. 10. 1995.
at A14.
41. See JEROME G. MILLER, NATIONAL CTR. ON INSTS. & ALTERNATIVFS. HOBBUNG A GENERATION:
YOUNG AFRICAN-AMERICAN MALES IN WASHINGTON, D.C.'s CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM I (1992).
42. See MARC MAUER & TRACY HULING, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG BLACK AMERICANS IN
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: FIvE YEARS LATER I (1995).
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minimize the burden that criminals themselves present to the
community. It is simply to suggest that incarceration-especially on
such a massive scale in a well-defined community-is far from an
adequate solution, and may well exacerbate the problems associated
with crack and crime.43
Moreover, even those black people who are not inner-city residents will share
in the social stigmatization that results from an increase in the black prison
population.' The predictable result of placing more black people in prison is
the further criminalization of the already maligned African-American image.45
Thus, despite the prescriptions of Wilson, Kelling, and Kennedy, law
enforcement officials' record of racial bias argues against an expansion of their
already broad discretionary powers. Perhaps these authors are optimistic that
interactions between minority groups and police officers will improve. Yet, a
cursory inspection of any urban newspaper or magazine indicates that police-
minority interactions are in a dreadful state.46 A blanket faith in the goodwill
of police officers is thus patently unjustified and will remain so as long as
crime generally47 and quality-of-life concerns more specifically48 are defined
43. Cole, supra note 39, at 2558.
44. Cole continues:
The criminal justice system contributes to a stereotyped and stigmatic view of African
Americans as potential criminals. That stereotype plays a role in the storekeeper's decision not
to buzz a young black man into her store; the employer's decision not to hire a black applicant;
the police officer's decision to stop a black traveler in an airport, white neighborhood or fancy
car, the citizen's decision to cross the street at the sight of an approaching group of black
teenagers; and the schoolteacher's assumption that a black student is less likely to excel at
school and more likely to get into trouble. In countless daily interactions and in innumerable




46. See, e.g., Russell Ben-Ali, Black Cops Question Shooting of P.A. Officer; Black Cops Demand
Probe, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.), Nov. 26, 1997, at 19; Kevin C. Dilworth, Head of Black Police
Chapter Favors Tough Stand on Brutality, STAR-LEDGER (Newark, NJ.), Feb. 1, 1998, at 32; Michael
Fletcher, Police Brutality Protesters March on Justice Department, WASH. PoST, Sept. 13, 1997, at A6;
Blaine Harden & Devon Spurgeon, Marching New Yorkers Protest Brutality; In Wake of Allegations of
Torture of Haitian Immigrant, Officers Are Called 'Perverts' and 'Racists,' WASH. POST, Aug. 30, 1997,
at A4; Michael Kramer, How Cops Go Bad-Brutality, Racism, Cover-Ups, Lies: A Guilty Police Officer
Tells How the Process Works, TIME, Dec. 15, 1997, at 78; Joseph D. McNamara, Too Many Cops Think
It's a War, TIME, Sept. 1, 1997, at 28; Steve Mills, U.S. To Probe Cop's Alleged Beating; Witnesses
Support Black Officer's Side ofArrest Incident, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1998, at 1; Peter Noel, Cop in Giuliani
Time: Black Activist Charges Vicious Police Beat Down, VILLAGE VOIc, Aug. 26, 1997, at 38; Police
Shooting Spurs Accusations of Racism; Twice in Six Months, an Unarmed Black Has Been Killed by a
White Officer in Charlotte, N.C., ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 14, 1997, at AS. But see Richard Lacoyo, Good
Cop, Bad Cop-Headlines About Brutality Have Overshadowed the Real News: More Cities Are Reining
In Police Misbehavior, TIME, Sept. 1, 1997, at 26.
47. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal Line, 7 J. CoNTEMP. LEGAL
IsSuES 1, 21 (1996).
48. See David S. Cohen, Official Oppression: A Historical Analysis of Low-Level Police Abuse and
a Modern Attempt at Reform, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 165, 179 (1996) ("Today, an entire class of
crime, so-called 'quality of life' offenses, is defined largely as what the poor do--sleep in the streets, beg
for money, squeegee unwilling car drivers' windshields, etc."). For an extreme demonstration of this point,
see Ellickson, supra note 22, which argues for the zoning of annoying, chronically homeless people who
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in terms of things that poor people and minorities do. As William Stuntz puts
it,
Criminal suspects and defendants are much more likely than the
general population to be poor and black-two classes that are often
thought to do badly in the political arena. And in a world where
police and prosecutors have enforcement discretion, criminal suspects
are defined by the willingness of public officials (police or
prosecutors) to impose heavy costs on them. The very fact that they
are in this particular pool suggests they need a lifeguard .... Criminal
suspects tend not to be "like us," and the risk is that that is why they
are criminal suspects.49
In conclusion, the problem with the arguments advanced by Wilson,
Kelling, and Kennedy is two-fold. First, even if police officers were unbiased,
the mass incarceration of African Americans would have a disparately negative
impact on minority communities because of various concerns, including
stigmatization effects, the increase in single-parent families, and related
employment challenges resulting from an influx of African Americans with
criminal records. Second, because police officers in fact might be motivated
by bias, a "broken windows" philosophy could intensify acrimony between
police officers and minority communities. Indeed, although "redneck" racism
is no longer the societal norm,"° minorities continue to occupy their historical
role at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder,5' and laws granting police
officers broad discretionary powers play a significant role in keeping them
there. The remainder of this Note supports this latter claim.
II. THE LEGACY OF BLACK CODES AND VAGRANCY-TYPE LAws
The history of vagrancy laws reveals most vividly the dangerous
implications for racial minorities and other disadvantaged communities of
broad police discretion in crime prevention. The origins of vagrancy legislation
can be traced to the decline of feudalism and the depopulation wrought by the
Black Death in the fourteenth century. 2 Vagrancy statutes were a failed
occupy public spaces.
49. Stuntz, supra note 47, at 20-21.
50. See infra Section III.B.
51. See generally DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAw (1992) (discussing the
history of racism against American blacks).
52. See Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration. 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603. 615 (1956).
For other insightful historical studies of vagrancy, see generally A.L BEIER. MASTERLESS MEN: THE
VAGRANCY PROBLEM IN ENGLAND, 1560-1640 (1985); JOHN POUND, POVERTY AND VAGRANCY IN TUDOR
ENGLAND (1971); CJ. RIBTON-TURNER, A HISTORY OF VAGRANTS AND VAGRANCY (1972); and Jeffrey
S. Adler, A Historical Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 209 (1989). For discussions of
more contemporary examples of vagrancy-type laws, see WILLIAM HARBuII DAwSON. THE VAGRANCY
PROBLEM (1910); LAWS OF THE VARIOUS STATES RELATING TO VAGRANCY (1916): William 0. Douglas.
Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion, 70 YALE. L.J. I (1960); Jerome Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relanon
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attempt to craft "a substitute for serfdom by tying workers to their jobs.""a
Indeed, workers were forced into nomadicism by lack of work or wretched
working conditions. By the middle of the seventeenth century and continuing
until the nineteenth century, the existence of a large number of "masterless
men and their families" crowding England's streets led to a change of
emphasis in vagrancy laws.-4 Although previously directed toward requiring
work at fixed locations, vagrancy laws evolved into methods of control and
banishment of unwanted people who threatened "financial burden, nuisance
and potential criminality." 55 These laws also ensured that "undesirable"
foreigners would be denied unencumbered ingress into local communities.56
Thus, since their conception, vagrancy statutes have aimed to control
"undesirable" groups who threaten to destabilize local communities.
Historically, these statutes have ensured that society's most disadvantaged
groups are kept within limits defined by and acceptable to majority groups.57
Although vagrancy-type laws have a long and complex history within the
United States,58 racial minorities have always been a primary victim of such
statutes and ordinances. 59 As the paradigmatic caste of "undesirables," black
people have historically been targeted by vagrancy ordinances. This was
especially true after the Civil War, when southern legislators sought innovative
ways to constrain black populations that were then technically free. With the
to Contemporary Social Problems, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 345 (1936); Rollin M. Perkins, The Vagrancy
Concept, 9 HASTINGS L.. 237, 250-61 (1958); Arthur H. Sherry, Vagrants, Rogues and Vagabonds-Old
Concepts in Need of Revision, 48 CAL. L. REV. 557 (1960); T. Leigh Anenson, Comment, Another Casualty
of the War... Vagrancy Laws Target the Fourth Amendment, 26 AKRON L. REV. 493 (1993); and Note,
Use of Vagrancy-Type Lrvs for Arrest and Detention of Suspicious Persons, 59 YALE L.J. 1351 (1950).
Commentators and jurists have debated whether there is a renewed need for vagrancy-type laws. Compare
Barr, supra note 22, at 394, 396 ("[V]agrancy and anti-loitering laws would allow police to act upon their
educated and professional suspicions that something is awry..,. The key civil rights issue of today, the
real civil threat, is the ability to live with some modicum of safety."), and Clarence Thomas, Keynote
Address at Federalist Society Symposium, reprinted in I MICH. L. & POL'Y REV. 269, 269 (1996) (arguing
that the rights revolution has resulted in a "culture that declined to curb the excesses of self-
indulgence-vagrants and others who regularly roamed the streets had rights that could not be
circumscribed by the community's sense of decorum"), with H. Lee Sarokin, Civil Rights orNuisance: How
Should the Judge-Citizen View a Vagrant's Behavior?, I MICH. L. REV. 379, 382 (1996) ("Curfews,
rousting people, and using the billy club to get people to move on or away are very tempting tools if they
rid us of crime. But what is practical and productive is not always principled and proper.").
53. Foote, supra note 52, at 615.
54. See id. at 616.
55. Id.
56. See id.
57. See William J. Stuntz, Implicit Bargains, Government Power and the Fourth Amendment, 44
STAN. L. REV. 553, 560 (1992) ("[Mlost people probably would approve of greater police authority to keep
an eye on 'undesirables' (and to keep them out of 'nice' neighborhoods). That is why old-style loitering
and vagrancy laws were politically tolerable, notwithstanding their stunning breadth."); cf Forrest W.
Lacey, Vagrancy and Other Crimes of Personal Condition, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1203, 1205-06 (1953)
(implying that law enforcement officials enforcing vagrancy laws might disproportionately target certain
groups, including racial minorities).
58. See generally, e.g., Foote, supra note 52.
59. Cf Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972) (holding that vague vagrancy-
type ordinances "permit[] and encourage[] arbitrary enforcement of the law" and furnish "a convenient tool"
for discriminatory treatment of unpopular groups).
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help of broad vagrancy ordinances that enforced the provisions of most of the
former Confederate states' "Black Codes, ' 60 southern officials attempted to
reestablish control over their former property.
The Black Codes, which thrived in the South during Andrew Johnson's
"Presidential Reconstruction" of the United States, 61 epitomized the region's
dogged efforts to retain control of its black labor population, despite that
group's nominal change in status from slaves to freedmen. 62 Designed to
force the freed slaves to work for their former masters, the Black Codes relied
upon broadly defined vagrancy statutes as the central mechanism for regulating
the black workforce.63 Under this system of socioeconomic domination, the
prospect of being arrested and charged with vagrancy deterred black laborers
from leaving their former masters' plantations. 6'
Articles and editorials in southern newspapers of the postbellum period
provide a ready guide to the public opinion that motivated the Black Codes.
For example, the editor of a southern newspaper lamented that although he
accepted the fact that "fiat of war" had produced the death of slavery,6 the
lack of compelled labor would obviously translate into the destruction of the
southern economy. He queried, "[D]oes any man in his right senses[] ever
again expect to see clean fields and productive crops? I think not. '"
Two powerful stereotypes of ex-slaves combine to explain the editor's
conclusion. The first belief-that blacks are naturally servile-is evident in the
statements of postbellum southern officials deemed responsible for "Negro
affairs." For example, Reverend Horace James, Superintendent of Negro
Affairs in North Carolina, declared in 1865 that blacks constituted "a nation
of servants, [who would] always make the most faithful, pliable, obedient,
devoted servants that can enter our dwellings .... In the successive orders...
of industrial pursuits, those who have the least intelligence must needs perform
the more menial services, without respect to color or birth." 67 The second
60. See ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION. 1863-1877, at 199-201
(1988); William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South. 1865-1940: A Preliminary Analysts. in
4 RACE, LAW AND AMERICAN HISTORY, 1700-1990, at 13, 29 (Paul Finkelman ed.. 1992) ("The contract
system could work only if there was some way of forcing blacks to sign labor agreements in the first place.
Vagrancy statutes provided just such a means .....
61. FoNER, supra note 60, at 199.
62. See W.E.B. Du BoiS, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 167 (1962). For a recounting of the
black community's reactions, see Steven F. Miller et al., Between Emancipation and Enfranchisement: Law
and the Political Mobilization of Black Southerners During Presidential Reconstruction. 1865-1867. 70
CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1059 (1995).
63. Although only Mississippi and South Carolina explicitly mentioned race in their vagrancy statutes.
these statutes of all the states clearly targeted ex-slaves. See FONER. supra note 60. at 201 ('ITihe vagrant
contemplated was the plantation negro.").
64. See DU BOIS, supra note 62, at 167 (noting that although "[nlegroes were no longer real estate ...
[n]egroes were liable to a slave trade under the guise of vagrancy and apprenticeship laws.").
65. THEODORE BRANTNER WILSON, THE BLACK CODES OFTHE SOutH 44 (1965) (quoting an August
23, 1865, editorial from the Edgefield Advertiser).
66. Id.
67. GEORGE M. FREDRICKSON. THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-
AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 180 (1971) (quoting REVEREND HORACE JAMES.
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belief-that blacks are naturally lazy-is evident from the oft-repeated
declaration made during Presidential Reconstruction, "You cannot make the
negro work without physical compulsion. 68 In fact, white southerners were
so worried about the shiftlessness of ex-slaves that proposals circulated to
consider contracting labor from foreign countries, a practice common in the
West Indian British colonies following the abolition of slavery. As the
Savannah News reported, 'The editor of the Mobile Gazette, Admiral
Semmes.... says he speaks from experience when he recommends the
Coolies as a laboring class. To illustrate the industry and enterprise of this
class of the Chinese he cites the wonderful growth and prosperity of the city
of Singapore ... 69
In addition to economic concerns, white southerners were also concerned
with the implications of mobile free blacks for their quality of life.7" As a
contributor to the Semi-Weekly Floridian declared, "To live in town... is now
the general desire on the part of the freedmen.... A good vagrant system
cannot too soon be put in operation.,,7' The Black Codes-and the vagrancy
ordinances they included-were thus the response of southern white leaders to
concerns regarding their own newly ambiguous socioeconomic status. These
typically harsh codes were intended to regulate the black community and
ensure that the South would remain a "'white man's country."'"2 The post-
Civil War constitutional conventions called by southern states to reconstruct
their governments also addressed this concern. Alabama, Georgia, and
Mississippi, for example, inserted into their constitutions the declaration that
they would "guard [the former slaves] and the State against any evils that may
arise from their sudden emancipation.''73 It is clear, however, that the
paternalistic sponsors of these clauses primarily intended to protect southern
whites from any assault on white hegemony that might result from notions of
black equality.
As the first state to pass and implement its set of Black Codes, Mississippi
enacted legislation designed to keep black people in their rightful place-that
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SUPERINTENDENT OF NEGRO AFFAIRS IN NORTH CAROLINA 46 (1865)).
68. WILSON, supra note 65, at 44 (quoting Senator Carl Schurz, who reported that he "had heard this
hundreds of times").
69. Id. at 45 (quoting the Savannah News of November 8. 1866).
70. See ROBERT CRUDEN, THE NEGRO IN RECONSTRUCTnON 20 (1969) ("The fact was, of course, that
the white Southerner was face to face with a new phenomenon-Negro mobility-and it is not surprising
that he, like others faced with situations at once new and frightening, fell back on old clichds to comfort
himself and rationalize his behavior.").
71. WILSON, supra note 65, at 53 (quoting the Semi-Weekly Floridian of January 9, 1866).
72. CRUDEN, supra note 70, at 21 (quoting U.B. Phillips); see also Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection
No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status-Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119-
29 (1997) (examining how whites' concerns regarding status limited African-American progress in the
postbellum period).
73. WILSON, supra note 65, at 63 (emphasis added) (citing ALA. CONST. art. 4, § 36 (1865); GA.
CONST. art 2, § 5 (1865); MISs. CONST. art. 8 (1865)).
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is, on the plantation.74 One of the most controversial sections of Mississippi's
Black Code defined "vagrant[s]" as "runaways, drunkards, pilferers; lewd,
wanton, or lascivious persons, in speech or behavior, those who neglect their
employment, misspend their earnings, and fail to support their families; and
'all other idle and disorderly persons."' 75 The statute also regulated white
behavior that threatened the existing social order. Thus, a second group of
vagrants included idle blacks and "white persons associating with them 'on
terms of equality' or guilty of sexual relations with them." 76 The Act also
authorized local officials to impose a special poll tax on blacks aged eighteen
to sixty, the proceeds of which would be collected for a "Freedman's Pauper
Fund." Failure to, pay this tax constituted "prima facie evidence of
vagrancy."
77
Following Mississippi's lead, South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana
passed Black Codes in 1865.78 In early 1866, Florida, Virginia, Georgia,
North Carolina, Texas, Tennessee, and Arkansas issued comparable Black
Codes.79 Although the codes varied in style and substance, they all
endeavored to ensure that ex-slaves would be placed "in a special-that is,
inferior-position.' s°
As a result of the North's angry reaction to southern intransigence,
Presidential Reconstruction came to a close and Congressional Reconstruction
began,1 providing a brief respite from racial tyranny and ushering in the
repeal of racially oppressive vagrancy statutes.82 Nonetheless, after the 1877
Hayes-Tilden Compromise reinvigorated southern leaders by terminating
Congressional Reconstruction, white southerners targeted black people once
again.83 By 1890, with Jim Crow signaling the advent of a new era of white
hegemony, southern leaders were determined "to make the existing system of
caste and involuntary servitude even more rigid than it had already
become."84 Excepting Tennessee, all of the former Confederate states
promulgated new vagrancy laws between 1893 and 1909.m "These laws
74. See id. at 66.
75. Id. at 68. Compare expansions of the term "vagrant" in Alabama and Florida. Alabama's definition
included "'any runaway, stubborn servant or child"' and "'a laborer or servant who loiters away his time,
or refuses to comply with any contract for a term of service without just cause.'" Id. at 76. Florida's law
"'in relation to Contracts of Persons of Color"' declared that a black person must be punished for vagrancy
if his master complained of "'willful disobedience of orders, wanton impudence, or disrespect to his
employer or his authorized agent, failure to perform the work assigned to him. idleness, or abandonment
of the premises."' Id. at 99.
76. Id. at 68.
77. Id.
78. See id. at 71-80.
79. See id. at 96-115.
80. CRUDEN, supra note 70, at 21.
81. See id. at 26-34.
82. See FONER, supra note 60, at 209.
83. See id. at 587-601.
84. Cohen, supra note 60, at 30.
85. See id.
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defined the crime of vagrancy in painstaking detail, and yet, paradoxically,
they were even broader and vaguer than before." 86 Harsher than the
Reconstruction-era laws that had preceded them, these new vagrancy laws
served as primary tools in defining and policing the racial landscape that
existed through the 1960s,8 7 until the Supreme Court invalidated the use of
ambiguous vagrancy laws in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville.88
The majority opinion in Papachristou was the logical predicate of the
Court's earlier ruling in Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham.9 In that case,
a black defendant, Shuttlesworth, was charged with violating sections 1142 and
1231 of the General Code of the City of Birmingham, which gave police
officers broad powers to regulate sidewalk traffic. On April 4, 1962, Patrolman
Byars of the Birmingham Police Department witnessed a group of civil rights
advocates picketing selected stores. To Byars's repeated commands that the
group disperse, Shuttlesworth asked, "You mean to say that we can't stand
here on the sidewalk?" 9 After a few such verbal exchanges, Byars arrested
Shuttlesworth, who was eventually sentenced to "180 days at hard labor and
an additional 61 days at hard labor in default of a $100 fine and costs." 9'
The Supreme Court dismissed Shuttlesworth's convictions under both
sections 1142 and 1231 of the Birmingham General City Code. In particular,
the Court noted that section 1142, "[1]iterally read .... says that a person may
stand on a public sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police
officer of that city.... Instinct with its ever-present potential for arbitrarily
suppressing First Amendment liberties, that kind of law bears the hallmark of
a police state. '92
In Papachristou, the Court expanded upon this analysis. In this case, eight
defendants were convicted in a Florida municipal court of violating a local
vagrancy ordinance. The convictions reeked of racial discrimination. Two black
men and two white women, for example, had been driving in Jacksonville
when police officers stopped them and charged them with vagrancy. In a
decision consistently heralded "as a triumph of the rule of law,"93 the Court
worried publicly that the real danger of broadly worded vagrancy statutes was
their potential to harass and control minority groups.94 Specifically rejecting
86. Id.
87. See id. at 30-31.
88. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
89. 382 U.S. 87 (1965).
90. Id. at 89.
91. Id. at 88.
92. Id. at 90-91.
93. Livingston, supra note 18, at 601.
94. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); see also Jeffries, supra note
37, at 213-14 ("IThe 'worst case' breakdown of the rule of law is not random whim or caprice but hidden
bias and prejudice. And the single most potent concern at issue here is not an abstract interest in the
postulates of a just legal order but a specific commitment to end discrimination based on race or
ethnicity."); Stuntz, supra note 47, at 21 ("[Ihe real problem ... had nothing to do with the fuzziness of
the ordinance .... The problem in Papachristou was race-based criminalization.").
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the argument that vagrancy statutes should be tolerated because of their
usefulness in "nipp[ing crime] in the bud," 95 the Court declared:
Those generally implicated by the imprecise terms of the
ordinance-poor people, nonconformists, dissenters, idlers-may be
required to comport themselves according to the lifestyle deemed
appropriate by the Jacksonville police and the courts. Where, as here,
there are no standards governing the exercise of the discretion granted
by the ordinance, the scheme ... furnishes a convenient tool for
"harsh and discriminatory enforcement by local prosecuting officials,
against particular groups deemed to merit their displeasure." It results
in a regime in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to
"stand on a public sidewalk... only at the whim of any police
officer."'
Clearly implying that a central feature of vagrancy statutes was the use of
status as a predictor of future criminality,97 the Court cautioned that
"[a]rresting a person on suspicion . .. is foreign to our system, even when the
arrest is for past criminality."98
Twenty-five years after Papachristou, police-minority interactions remain
contentious." It is thus troubling that quality-of-life advocates would choose
to ignore the historical repudiation of broad vagrancy-type laws in order to
advance their calls for increased police discretion at the street level. It was
precisely this discretion that the Court-and civil rights organizations-rallied
against in Papachristou.'t° Thus, although civil injunctions are often "far
more specific than [the vagrancy laws] struck down in the 1960s and 1970s,"
they "raise many of the same concerns that led courts of that period to
invalidate public order laws for vagueness."'0 ' Indeed, in subtle and
rationalizable ways, anti-gang injunctions threaten to perpetuate the regime of
racial domination that the Papachristou Court fought so valiantly to dismantle.
95. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
96. Id. at 170 (quoting Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90; Thornhill v. Alabama. 310 U.S. 88. 97-98
(1940)).
97. See id. at 169; see also Foote, supra note 52. at 625 (noting that two different kinds of suspicion
are possible--that is, suspicion for either "'past" or "future" criminality--and that vagrancy laws target the
latter); Lacey, supra note 57, at 1217 (noting that vagrancy laws aim to target future criminality).
98. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 169.
99. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 179 ("Because the traditional role of the police is to enforce order
upon the lower classes .... the poor and disempowered are inherently more likely to find themselves at
the receiving end of police brutality."): id. at 181 ("[Tlhe police specifically and the government generally
have lost the trust and cooperation that these communities have to offer."); see also Robin K. Magee. The
Myth of the Good Cop and the Inadequacy of Fourth Amendment Remedies for Black Men. Contrasting
Presumptions ofInnocence and Guilt, 23 CAP. U. L. REv. 151. 208 (1994) (arguing that the criminal justice
system perpetuates stereotypes of black criminality).
100. See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156; see also Livingston. supra note 18. at 599 ("in the context
of the ... [1960s] civil rights struggles... the Supreme Court was increasingly called upon to invalidate
laws punishing vagrancy, loitering, trespass, and disorderly conduct.").
101. Livingston, supra note 18, at 560; see also id. at 642-44 (discussing anti-gang injunctions).
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III. AVERSIVE RACISM AND ANTI-GANG CIVIL INJUNCTIONS
At first glance, a comparison between the oppression of black people under
the Black Codes and the targeting of gangs by civil injunctions might seem
strained. Indeed, whereas vagrancy ordinances unapologetically invited broad
police discretion, anti-gang injunctions target specifically named individuals.
Moreover, modem police forces, which are fed on diets of "sensitivity
training" and encompass diverse groups including African Americans, arguably
do not operate within a regime of overt racial hostility. Finally, there are
profound differences between the "innocent" ex-slaves being oppressed in the
pre-Papachristou regime and the malevolent gangs oppressing communities
today. The ex-slaves were marked solely because of who they were; gang
members are ostensibly targeted because of what they do. Therefore, although
society should not base punishment on race, it is, and should be, perfectly
permissible to hold people accountable for their harmful actions.
Nonetheless, I argue in this part that these seemingly logical assertions are
based on unsound distinctions. More specifically, I argue that the targeted
nature of anti-gang injunctions does not counterbalance the excessive discretion
that such measures provide police officers and courts. I then use the social
psychological theory of aversive racism to explain why the disappearance of
overt racism does not translate into the disappearance of racism per se. Finally,
I conclude by noting how the amorphous concept of the "gang" invites
discretionary actions that oppress innocent minority youth.
A. Anatomy of an Anti-Gang Civil Injunction
In this section, I dissect the anti-gang civil injunction. I demonstrate that
although civil injunctions might not initially appear to invite broad police
discretion, such measures might in fact allow even broader police discretion
than vagrancy statutes. This inquiry is essential because civil injunctions are
an increasingly fashionable means of outfitting local governments and
municipalities in their "turf wars" against gangs for public spaces. 2 Indeed,
municipalities are increasingly soliciting courts to use their judicial power
against street gangs. Courts have generally responded favorably, granting
sweeping injunctions that restrain gang members from publicly engaging in
certain activities."' Gang members who subsequently engage in proscribedpastimes are subjected to months of incarceration and significant fines. Indeed,
102. See Boga, supra note 3, at 477.
103. See id. For examples of anti-gang injunctions, see City of Norwalk v. Orange Street Locos, No.
VC 016746 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 25, 1994) (preliminary injunction); People ex rel. Fletcher v. Acosta, No.
EC 010205 (Cal. Super. Ct. Apr. 7, 1993) (order for preliminary injunction); and People v. Playboy
Gangster Crips, No. WEC 118860 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 11, 1987) (preliminary injunction).
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through the use of a civil injunction, municipalities can effectively cast out
street gang members from the public space.'0 4
Particularly within the State of California, local governments have sought
and obtained broad injunctions aimed at limiting the scope of acceptable gang
behavior.'0 5  Between October 1992 and July 1994, for example,
municipalities in California applied for seven separate anti-gang injunctions
and received five of them.'0 6 Although the five communities that received
abatement injunctions have considered them "unqualified success[es],- ' o' this
"success" has come at potentially great cost to minority communities.
The lure of anti-gang injunctions stems from their nature as civil, as
opposed to criminal, penalties.'08 Although criminal laws are limited,
logically enough, to criminal behavior, injunctions can target noncriminal
conduct, offering prosecutors a "regime [that] operates as a remedy apart from
the criminal law." 39 Theoretically, police and the attorneys who assist them
could seek carefully crafted civil injunctions that would "limit police authority
by specifying the particular neighborhoods in which they apply, the persons
enjoined, and the precise conduct that is prohibited.""0 This project could
result in an inspired "close analysis of neighborhood problems and...
collaboration between law enforcement and community residents."'
This optimistic dream of improved community-police cooperation,
however, requires the presence of an unbiased criminal justice system for its
realization. Without such a foundation, the use of anti-gang civil injunctions
portends grave danger for minority communities. First, civil injunctions "lack
the admittedly imperfect safeguard against arbitrary governmental action
implicit in the requirement that laws be generally applied."" 2 This deficiency
means that key issues like specifying who can be legitimately enjoined, when
104. See Boga, supra note 3, at 477.
105. The California Supreme Court's decision in People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596 (Cal.
1997), identifies two potential sources of judicial authority to issue anti-gang injunctions in California: (1)
general nuisance laws; and (2) California's Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention (STEP) Act. CAL
PENAL CODE §§ 186.20-186.28 (West 1988 & Supp. 1997). The court noted that while a legislature could
declare a legislative act the exclusive remedy for abating gang activity. STEP expressly allows other means
of enjoining criminal street gangs. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 614. Regardless of which source of authority
is invoked, the person seeking an injunction must demonstrate that the defendant has violated her rights.
See Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753. 762 (1994). Accordingly. she must identify some
legal source promulgating the rights that she claims the defendant has violated.
106. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 219.
107. Boga, supra note 3. at 485.
108. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies To Achieve Criminal Law
Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law Distinction. 42 HAS'INGS LJ. 1325.
1345-48 (1991) (discussing the appeal of civil as opposed to criminal remedies).
109. Id. at 1343.
110. Livingston, supra note 18, at 644-45.
Ill. Id. at 645.
112. Id. at 643.
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injunctive relief is appropriate, and how relief should be fashioned in different
circumstances will ultimately depend upon a particular court's views." 3
The Supreme Court recognized this danger of civil injunctions in Madsen
v. Women's Health Center, Inc."4 The majority noted:
Ordinances represent a legislative choice regarding the promotion of
particular social interests. Injunctions, by contrast, are remedies
imposed for violations (or threatened violations) of a legislative or
judicial decree. Injunctions also carry greater risk of censorship and
discriminatory application than do general ordinances. "[T]here is no
more effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and unreasonable
government than to require that the principles of law which officials
would impose upon a minority must be imposed generally." 5
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Scalia derided both the Madsen majority's
ultimate decision to uphold the civil injunction and, more generally, the use of
civil injunctions targeted at the conduct of unpopular groups. Adding to the list
of dangers that attach to civil injunctions, Justice Scalia warned that
constitutional free speech rights "should not lightly be placed within the
control of a single man or woman," particularly when an injunction signifies
the taking of sides in a dispute."t 6
A second danger of civil injunctions stems from the fact that many
guarantees of the Bill of Rights attach themselves only to criminal proceedings.
Although civil injunctions promise the possibility of removing street gangs
from public spaces without the hassle of worrying about individual rights," 7
enjoined groups are left without secure constitutional protection. As Mary
Cheh explains:
Police and prosecutors have embraced civil strategies not only because
they expand the arsenal of weapons available to reach antisocial
behavior, but also because officials believe that civil remedies offer
speedy solutions that are unencumbered by the rigorous constitutional
protections associated with criminal trials .... A persistent question
remains regarding the use of civil remedies to check antisocial
behavior: what constitutional limits constrain their use?"t 8
Unfortunately, the answer to Cheh's "persistent question" is "not enough."
In fact, the reason that civil remedies are so attractive to prosecutors and police
113. See id. at 643-44.
114. 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
115. Id. at 764 (quoting Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949))
(citations omitted).
116. Id. at 793 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
117. But cf. Stuntz, supra note 47, at 1 (noting that an alternative approach would be for courts to
manipulate the substantive scope of criminal law).
118. Cheh, supra note 108, at 1329.
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officers is precisely that civil due process requirements are much less stringent
and comprehensive than analogous criminal due process guarantees." 9 In
particular, although a party to a civil proceeding will normally be guaranteed
a predeprivation hearing and the burden of persuasion will rest with the
moving party, the threshold of proof is not beyond a reasonable doubt, but the
less demanding preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.'20 Additionally,
there is no right to appointment of counsel.12' Once one adds to these
considerations courts' "freedom to proscribe otherwise legal acts and create
personal criminal codes"' and the deference that appellate courts give trial
judges, 2 3 the full extent of the limited protections available to a party in a
civil proceeding becomes more apparent.
Finally, although a defendant in contempt proceedings (which are used to
enforce violations of injunctions) obtains the panoply of procedural due process
guarantees that attach to criminal penalties, the collateral bar rule of Walker
v. Birmingham'2 prohibits such a defendant from challenging an injunction's
constitutionality, limiting the issues in the contempt hearing to whether the
court had jurisdiction to issue the injunction and whether the defendant
knowingly violated it.'2 As Justice Scalia explained in Madsen, the
imposition of the collateral bar rule means that the targets of injunctions who
have neither the time nor the money to challenge them "face a Hobson's
choice: They must remain silent, since if they speak their First Amendment
rights are no defense in subsequent contempt proceedings."'2 Indeed, an
indigent and uneducated defendant might not have access to counsel, a fact
that potentially impinges on such a defendant's ability to challenge both an
injunction's scope and the factual basis for subjecting the defendant to an
injunction.' 27 Moreover, in those situations in which the injunction was
issued ex parte, the injunction's target will have been denied a chance to be
heard and will subsequently have the burden of proving that the court's order
was improper. 28 The sum of these dangers is that defendants in civil
119. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 253-55. But see Chch. supra note 108. at 1369 (arguing that civil
procedural due process imposes significant safeguards against arbitrariness.)
120. See Cheh, supra note 108, at 1394.
121. See id. at 1395 n.365.
122. Yoo, supra note 4, at 254.
123. For cases demonstrating the traditionally limited scope of appellate review. sec. for example,
Doran v. Salem Inn Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975); and Brown %, Chore. 411 U.S. 452 (1973). For a case
demonstrating how the expeditious nature of an injunction can translate into relaxed procedural
considerations, see, for example, Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310 (1940). But for
an example of extensive review by an appellate court, see Thornburgh it American College of Obstetricians
& Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986).
124. 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
125. See id. at 315.
126. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc.. 512 U.S. 753, 793-94 (1994) (Scalia. J.. dissenting).
127. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 255.
128. See id.
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proceedings are left relatively unprotected, an acutely vulnerable position if the
defendants belong to politically underrepresented minority groups.
An examination of the five primary restrictions evident in California's anti-
gang injunctions illustrates both the crime-fighting promise and the repressive
potential of this approach. First, the injunctions have prohibited gang members
from annoying or harassing neighborhood residents. Second, they have targeted
gang members' attempts to demand entry into residents' homes. Third, the
injunctions have regulated gang clothing and hand signs. Fourth, they have
restricted the local movement of gang members. And fifth, they have curtailed
gang members' right to congregate in public spaces. 29
Although these provisions are facially race-neutral, they must be reviewed
skeptically. Indeed, despite their lack of overt racial language, these
provisions-in particular, the restrictions on the rights to association and
movement-bear an uncomfortable resemblance to the postbellum vagrancy
laws.
B. Aversive Racism
The overt system of racial subordination represented by the Black Codes
is largely a historical artifact. 30 Most whites no longer publicly express
thoughts of black inferiority.' 3' Nonetheless, blacks and other minorities
continue to suffer from stigma and disadvantage. 32 This is largely because
more subtle forms of racism now dominate the racial landscape.'
33
Building upon this observation, Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio have
constructed a theoretical model known as "aversive racism."' t3 The
129. See id. at 222-25.
130. See generally NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A COMMON DESTINY: BLACKS AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY (Gerald D. Jaynes & Robin M. Williams, Jr. eds., 1989) (providing a comprehensive statistical
compilation of race opinion surveys); HOWARD SCHUMAN Er AL., RACIAL ATFITUDE IN AMERICA 193
(1985) (charting racial attitudes).
131. See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Joanne Martin, Shaping the Organizational Context for Black
American Inclusion, 43 J. SOC. ISSUES 41, 43 (1987).
132. See generally BELL, supra note 51 (detailing the history of racism within the United States).
133. See Samuel L. Gaertner & John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in PREJUDICE.
DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 61, 61 (John F Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986); James R. Klugel
& Eliot R. Smith, Whites' Beliefs About Black Opportunities, 47 AM. Soc. REv. 518, 529 (1982). Klugel
and Smith's research is presented in greater detail in JAMES R. KLUGEL & ELIOT R. SMITH, BELIEFS ABOUT
INEQUALITY (1986).
134. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133. A number of other social psychological theories also
attempt to explain modem forms of racism. See, e.g., Patricia G. Devine & Kristin A. Vasquez-Suson, The
Rocky Road to Positive Intergroup Relations, in RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE 234 (Jennifer
L. Eberhardt & Susan T. Fiske eds., 1998) (advancing a prejudice disassociation model that explains the
process by which people can inhibit or control their racist tendencies); Irwin Katz ct al., Racial
Ambivalence, Value Duality, and Behavior, in PREjUDICF, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 133,
at 35 (arguing that "ambivalent racism" reflects a combination of sympathy for blacks' plight with the
belief that they have contributed significantly to it); John B. McConahay, Modem Racism, Ambivalence,
and the Modem Racism Scale, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM, supra note 133, at 91
(arguing that "modem racists" are largely unaware of their racist feelings); Don Operario & Susan T. Fiske,
Racism Equals Power Plus Prejudice: A Social Psychological Equation for Racial Oppression, in RACISM:
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individual they characterize as the aversive racist disassociates herself from
overtly racist actions and may even exaggerate her behaviors to reinforce her
nondiscriminatory self-perception.'35 Along political axes, she would be
labeled a "liberal."' 136 Nonetheless, her racial attitudes are essentially
ambivalent.'37 Although the subject might not openly express hostility or hate
for black people, her likely reactions will often include discomfort, uneasiness,
and fear138  expressed in "subtle, rationalizable ways."' 139  Gaertner and
Dovidio label this model aversive racism because the aversive racist regards
as aversive not only blacks, but also suggestions that she is prejudiced.'"
Thus, even as the subject maintains a perception of being egalitarian, her
actions reveal that she has not fully internalized egalitarian attitudes.'4 '
Unlike early theories of racism that focused upon the psychopathology of
prejudice,'42 aversive racism posits that "the negative feelings that aversive
racists harbor toward blacks are rooted in three types of normal, often adaptive,
psychological processes."' 4 3 The first process is cognitive in the sense that
it involves the human need to classify things.' The problem of aversive
racism begins, however, when the need to classify transforms itself into in-
group bias. 5 The second process is motivational because it relates to the
THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE, supra, at 34-35 (arguing that power "engenders stercotypic thinking.
encourages in-group favoritism, and enhances perceived intergroup differences-); David 0. Scars, Racism
and Politics in the United States, in RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE REsPO.NSE, supra. at 76. 83-89
(explaining how "symbolic racism" articulates itself through political values and personal ideology); Jim
Sidanius et al., Hierarchical Group Relations, Institutional Terror and the D)namics of the Criminal
Justice System, in RACISM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE, supra. at 136 (advancing a -social
domination" theory, which maintains that complex human societies appear predisposed to organize
themselves as group-based social hierarchies with one or a small number of dominant groups and at least
one subordinate group). Aversive racism theory's primary competitors are probably "symbolic racism" and
"modem racism." I have opted to use aversive racism because, unlike these alternatives, it focuses upon
the actions and motivations of people who would probably label themselves "liberal." For legally oriented
critiques of modem forms of racism, see R. Richard Banks & Jennifer L Eberhardt, Social Psychological
Processes and the Legal Bases of Racial Categorization, in RACtSM: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE,
supra, at 54; Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, but Now I See": White Race Consciousness and the
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REv. 953. 983-85 (1993); and Charles R. Lawrence Ill.
The Id, the Ego and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 ST'AN. L REv. 317 (1987).
135. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133. at 62.
136. See John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner, On the Nature of Contemporary Prejudice: The
Causes, Consequences, and Challenges of Aversive Racism, in RACISM: THE PROBLE%t AND TiE REsPONSE,
supra note 134, at 3, 8. This facet of aversive racism distinguishes it from its prime competitors--that is.
symbolic racism and "modem racism"--because those models focus more on political conservatives. See
id.
137. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133, at 61.
138. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 136, at 5.
139. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133, at 62.
140. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 136, at 5.
141. See Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133, at 84-86.
142. See, e.g., T.W. ADORNO ET AL, THE AUTHORtTARIAN PERSONALtTY (1950) (advancing a
psychopathological theory of prejudice).
143. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 136, at 5.
144. See G.W. ALLORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 17-28 (2d ed. 1958).
145. Cf. Operario & Fiske, supra note 134, at 34-35 (noting that power "engenders stereotypic
thinking, encourages in-group favoritism, and enhances perceived intergroup differences").
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human desire to satisfy basic needs. The problem here begins when some
needs-for example, the need for power or the need for control-begin to
align themselves with in-group biases. 46 The last process is sociocultural in
that it stems from the internalization of social values and beliefs. If the
nation's commitment to racial justice is equivocal, the aversive racism model
predicts that this conflicted position will reflect itself in the racial commitments
of large numbers of individual whites.
47
Because of her dissonant racial attitudes, the aversive racist will try to
avoid interracial interactions. If she cannot, she will "experience anxiety or
discomfort, and consequently try to disengage from the interaction as quickly
as possible."'148 Because part of her discomfort stems from a desire to act
appropriately and not appear prejudiced, the aversive racist will "strictly adhere
to established rules and codes of behavior" in interracial settings.149 In such
environments, the normative structure within the situation will be "clear and
unambiguous."' 5 Onlookers will thus scrutinize questionable racial actions
more skeptically and charges of racism will be more difficult to deny. Thus,
the aversive racist will likely assert that she is "color-blind" and therefore
unable to act or think in discriminatory ways.' Conversely, when the
"normative structure within the situation is weak, ambiguous, or conflicting"
(e.g., in intraracial environments),'52 the subject will feel more comfortable
expressing racial comments because she can more easily dismiss charges of
racism.
Although the aversive racist's expression of negative racial attitudes may
be subtle, the consequences of these racial attitudes are not. Aversive racism
may be as, if not more, harmful to minority communities than old-fashioned,
"dominative" racism.'53 Both systems "contribute to the restriction of
opportunity for blacks and other minorities"'' 54 and "perpetuate the social and
economic advantages of the majority group over minority groups."' 55
Aversive racism's very subtlety, however, makes it more difficult to challenge.
As Dovidio and Gaertner explain, "Like a virus that has mutated, racism has
evolved into different forms that are more difficult not only to recognize but
also to combat .... In organizational decision-making ... in which the
controlled conditions of an experiment are rarely possible, [aversive racism]
146. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 136, at 6.
147. See id.
148. Id. at 7.
149. Id.
150. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133, at 66.
151. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 136, at 7.
152. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133, at 66.
153. For a discussion on "dominative" racism, see JOEL KOVEL, WHITE RACISM: A PSYCtOHISTORY
54 (1970).
154. Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 136, at 18.
155. Id.at 31.
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presents a substantial challenge" to the goal of racial equality.'56 This
challenge is made even more perverse by the fact that "aversive racists are not
only generally unaware of their prejudice, but also ... motivated to remain
unaware." 1
57
The aversive racism model is potentially illuminating when applied to
Wilson and Kelling's quality-of-life arguments.' 5 The theory predicts that
arguments about minority communities will be framed in nonracial terms (e.g.,
innocent crime victims versus malevolent gang members) rather than in
explicitly racial terms (e.g., threatening and undesirable minority youth versus
fearful and uncomfortable members of the dominant white majority).'" A
review of the "broken windows" argument supports this framing prediction.
Wilson and Kelling's discussion is fashioned as a symbolic battle between a
"raceless" vagrant and an entire community."W With the normative racial
structure thus ambiguous, the argument strategically ignores the civil rights
arguments that precipitated Papachristou. This deracialization allows the
authors to advance arguments that are in fact deeply racial in "subtle,
rationalizable ways."'
16 1
More specifically, Wilson and Kelling call for decreased civil rights for
undesirables while also repudiating police discrimination.' 62 The authors thus
strike an ambivalent stance by going on record as opposing racial
discrimination. If an onlooker were to label them "racists," the authors would
likely attempt to dismiss this claim by highlighting their opposition to police
discrimination and reasserting their plea for the improved selection, training,
and supervision of police officers. 63
Nonetheless, as the aversive racism model predicts, although the racial
motivations of Wilson and Kelling might be subtle, the consequences of their
policy prescriptions are not. Indeed, the "broken windows" literature is
arguably the academic centerpiece of the "quality-of-life" revolution,"
which had predictably damaging effects on minority communities.' 65 In fact,
because of the very subtlety of the racialized argu.ments embedded within the
"broken windows" literature, it is much more difficult to challenge the racially
156. Id. at 25.
157. Id. at 28.
158. Given the particularly pervasive influence of Wilson and Kelling's "broken windows" argument
within criminology circles, public policy circles, and the academy. see sources cited supra note 22. 1 am
arguing by extension that the existence of aversive racism in Wilson and Kelling's work is representative
of a larger social phenomenon.
159. See Dovidio & Gaertner, supra note 136, at 7.
160. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 17.
161. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133. at 62.
162. See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 17. at 35.
163. See id
164. See Livingston, supra note 18, at 578.
165. Cf. Cohen, supra note 48, at 179 (noting the overlap between "quality-of-life" offenses and things
done by poor people); Cole, supra note 39, at 2558 (noting the negative consequences of incarcerating large
numbers of African Americans).
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disparate impacts of the argument's derivative programs. Unlike the old-
fashioned racists who dominated political and academic discussions in the early
portion of the twentieth century, aversive racists clothed their negative racial
attitudes in an armor of subtlety.
Conversely, because blacks are not typically presumed to support racial
discrimination against other blacks, Randall Kennedy" argues without much
fear of being labeled a racist. He can thus easily maintain his self-image as an
egalitarian, nonracist person. Indeed, the idea of the American people's
labeling a black person's comments about his own race "racist" is almost
unimaginable. On the contrary, most white Americans would reward authors
like Kennedy with a sympathetic presumption of self-interested nonracism
when such authors discuss the African-American community. Indeed, authors
like Kennedy are allowed to advance potentially disparaging comments about
black people because it is presumably against such authors' self-interest to
stigmatize their race. Given the racial realities of modern America, the fate of
black authors---even wealthy black professors-is inseparable from the fate of
black people more generally. Under this logic, it would seem foolish for black
authors to posit arguments aimed at hindering members of their own race.
Accordingly, black authors are awarded a presumption of nonracism.
Similarly, although some black Americans might impulsively label authors
like Kennedy "sell-outs" or even "Uncle Toms," it is unlikely that they would
label such authors "racists." Indeed, even if authors like Kennedy were deemed
"self-hating" blacks who suffered from significant class biases, it is unlikely
that most African Americans would charge such authors with a race-based bias
against the black community.' 67 Again, the logic in the black community
might be that it is not in the interest of any African American to impede the
struggle for racial equality. Thus, although there might be significant name-
calling within the black community, class-related disagreements, and much
dispute over the political future of the black community, the normative
structure is such that blacks will probably not label other blacks "racist." Were
Kennedy a white author, charges of racism would be less easily dismissed. To
be sure, a white person promoting Kennedy's arguments might entice charges
of aversive-or even old-fashioned-racism.
C. The Troubling Marriage of Gang Abatement Efforts and Civil Injunctions
The aversive racism model provides a potentially powerful framework for
understanding and critiquing the sweeping "wars" against the amorphous
minority organizations labeled "gangs." Within the context of anti-gang civil
166. See supra text accompanying notes 30-32.
167. See, e.g., Paul Butler, (Color) Blind Faith: The Tragedy of Race, Crime, and the Law, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1270, 1273 (1998) (book review) (chastising "Respectable Randall," "who admits to valuing
specially the esteem of white people," as "worse than irresponsible").
(Vol. 107: 22492272
Black Codes and Broken Windows
injunctions, the model would predict that the raceless metaphor of "war" might
mask underlying racial attitudes that ultimately conspire to oppress and
stigmatize innocent minority populations generally and innocent minority youth
in particular. Some of these youth might romanticize gang culture but not
actively associate with gang members. Others might actively associate with
gang members, but lack the specific intent to further the gang's criminal aims.
In either case, anti-gang civil injunctions invite concerns identical to those that
compelled the Papachristou Court to repudiate vague public order laws.
In this section, I address these arguments in greater depth. First, I explore
the functions that gangs serve in disadvantaged communities. I then continue
the previous discussion on civil injunctions and examine the California
Supreme Court opinion applauding their use. Finally, I conclude by arguing
that because a conspicuous effect of anti-gang injunctions (like the earlier
vagrancy-type laws) is the stigmatization of minority communities, such
injunctions should be tolerated only in very limited circumstances.
1. Gangs as Proxies
The precise identity of the "enemy" in wars against gangs is, at best,
ambiguous. Apart from overhyped media definitions, the term "gang" has no
clear, universally agreed-upon meaning.' r Given the proliferation of statutes
and injunctions aimed at gang abatement, however, some associations of
people are clearly being targeted and punished for their collective
identities. 69
Whatever definition of "gang" one employs, there are a few recurring
features. Unfortunately, "gangs" tend to "come out of low-income, non-
caucasian, urban communities."'' 70 This observation yields two important
implications. First, given that minority youths who sport urban cultural garb
are often lumped together in uncomplicated stereotypes and treated
suspiciously,'7' some minority youths might automatically be labeled gang
members even though similarly situated-and similarly outfitted-white youth
would not receive such labels.' 72 Second, the confluence of these factors
suggests that gangs might serve as alternative sources of social organization
168. See SKOGAN, supra note 22, at 25; Destro. supra note 2. at 788 ('1The term *gang' is notoriously
imprecise .... ); cf. JANKOWKSI, supra note 15, at 141 (noting that some acts of violence committed by
individuals are attributed to gangs).
169. See JANKOWSKI, supra note 15, at 141.
170. Harper, supra note 4, at 52. For a more comprehensive study of gang structure and membcrship.
see generally JANKOWSKI, supra note 15.
171. See Harper, supra note 4, at 52 (noting the role played by the media in encouraging the public
to think of gang violence as a racial problem); see also Magee, supra note 99. at 207-13 (discussing the
dominant culture's negative perceptions of black men).
172. Cf. Harper, supra note 4, at 52 (noting that some criminal activity by groups of white youths is
not characterized as "gang" activity); Boga, supra note 3, at 487-88 (noting that gangs, like fraternities and
sororities, serve as socializing outlets for teenagers).
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within disorganized communities73 in a state of "violent social crisis."'74
A black man, for example, has "a 1-in-21 chance of being murdered, while a
white man . . . has a 1-in-333 chance."' 75 Although blacks constitute only
twelve percent of the U.S. population, more than fifty percent of people in
U.S. jails are black. 76 Thus, as Frank Harper concludes,
Faced with the deterioration of traditionally stable institutions such as
the family, church, or schools-institutions where adults (parents)
offer strong role models and exercise true authority-"underclass"
youth may turn to gang membership in hopes of finding a substitute
for those unavailable institutions. Against the backdrop of urban life,
gangs may offer to teenagers a variety of services they simply cannot
get elsewhere. 77
Moreover, gang protection can literally mean the difference between life and
death in some communities. 78 Because many disadvantaged neighborhoods
tend to be very violent and police officers are not viewed as trustworthy allies,
local youths might adopt an "if you can't beat 'em join 'em" mentality. 79
The lack of alternative outlets for social gathering, peer interaction, and
communal bonding provides a second rationale for gang membership. In many
communities, gangs may provide "the primary social institution of the
neighborhood."' 80 Terence Boga elaborates:
Gangs, like popularly accepted associations, employ identifying
clothing and secret hand signals that distinguish members from
outsiders and foster feelings of camaraderie. Both gangs and
fraternities serve universal needs for peer approval and
companionship. The primary difference between these two
associations is that fraternities occupy designated housing, while street
gangs perform these functions in public space.'
8
'
A final incentive for joining gangs stems from the economically devastated
conditions prevailing in many inner-city communities.' 2 Trapped by the
reality of neighborhoods in profound economic decay, 3 the "exit of large
173. See Molina, supra note 6, at 465.
174. Harper, supra note 4, at 46.
175. Id. (citation omitted).
176. See id. at 46-47.
177. Id. at 48.
178. See, e.g., Rutkowski, supra note 14, at 154 (recounting the story of Anthony Burgos, who was
killed because he was not affiliated with a gang).
179. Id. at 153-55.
180. Boga, supra note 3, at 488.
181. Id. at 487-88.
182. The socioeconomic decay of American cities is charted in WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, TtiE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED (1987).
183. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 14, at 11-23 (examining the effect of East Los Angeles's economic
deterioration on local Latinos).
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urban employers .... structural deterioration that affects everything from
housing to inner-city services,"' ' the complete egress of the middle
class, 18 5 large-scale unemployment,' 86 and parents who inhabit the bottom
rungs of the socioeconomic ladder, 87 gangs-and the drug trade-might
provide many inner-city youth with the "only economically rational alternative
available."' 88 Under this view, gangs represent "counter-organizations"
geared to "fulfilling the standards of the larger society"' 89 by providing
minority youth with "an alternate form of employment with which they could
hope to 'make it' in U.S. society."'"
Despite the similarity of aims that precipitate gang membership within
disadvantaged communities, all gang members are not created equal. According
to one characterization scheme, there are three levels of standing within gangs.
The first level comprises the "leaders," hard-core gang members who
participate in the organization's most violent activities. These "homeboys"
constitute approximately fifty percent of most gangs.' 9' The second level, so-
called "peripheral members," are tied to the gang, but do not actively
participate in its social life; peripherals are, however, called upon to participate
in the gang's activities.'92 Recruits constitute the last level of "true" gang
members, and their roles are initially undefined. 93
Outside of the gang, there are "wannabes," typically community youths
infatuated with gang culture but technically not a part of it. 9 Although they
do not fully share the gang's aims or activities, these youngsters might assert
membership in gangs or experiment with gang clothing because of "youthful
arrogance or a desire to be placed in protective custody."'"
184. Harper, supra note 4, at 46.
185. See WILSON, supra note 182, at 135-38.
186. See id. at 157-59.
187. See Boga, supra note 3, at 489.
188. Id.
189. Id. (citation omitted). Advertisers, for example, often target "aspirational brands" at local urban
cultures, understanding that many minority youth aspire to "'the imagined life of ease in white suburban
country clubs." Joshua Levine, Badass Sells, FORBES. Apr. 21, 1997. at 142, 142-48 (descnbing how
corporate marketplaces have discovered that If]or products to sell in Greenwich and Grosse Pointe. they
better be 'butter' on the inner-city streets of New York and Los Angeles").
190. Boga, supra note 3, at 489 (footnote omitted).
191. Rutkowski, supra note 14, at 149.
192. Id.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 150. For a more detailed discussion of "'wannabes," see DANIEL J. MONTI. WANNABE:
GANGS IN SUBURBS AND SCHOOLS (1994), which discusses suburban gangs and "wannabes" outside of the
well-known inner city gangs.
195. People ex rel. Gallo v. Acuna, 929 P.2d 596, 621 (Cal. 1997) (Chin. J.. concumng in pan and
dissenting in part); see also Yoo, supra note 4, at 234 ("Be skeptical about what you hear, even if you get
it directly from gang members. (Gang members have lots of games to play-with themselves. wtth each
other, with police or anybody else in authority, and with anybody who can possibly be 'tmpressed.')-
(quoting Joan Moore, Gangs and Gang Violence: What We Know and What IWe Don't,. in GANG VIOLENCE
PREVENTION 23, 23 (Alfredo Gonzalez et al. eds., 1990))).
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This last group-and to some extent, perhaps, the group composed of
peripheral members-is particularly relevant in the context of anti-gang civil
injunctions and statutes. If gangs are pervasive influences within disadvantaged
communities and the population of nonviolent gang members and "wannabes"
is significant, broadly worded anti-gang injunctions might ensnare youngsters
not involved in crime and unwittingly increase their reasons for, and ability to
pursue, official or more active gang membership.'96 Comparable to the
broadly worded vagrancy statutes of the postbellum period, broadly worded
civil injunctions threaten to perpetuate a regime of guilt by racial and cultural
association.
2. The More Things Change...
Although anti-gang civil injunctions raise many of the same concerns that
the U.S. Supreme Court fretted about in Papachristou, the California Supreme
Court recently praised their use as crime-fighting measures in the "urban war
zone."' 97 In People ex rel Gallo v. Acuna,'9' members of a San Jose gang
challenged an injunction that, among other things, proscribed the gang's
enjoined members from "[s]tanding, sitting, walking, driving, gathering or
appearing anywhere in public view with any other defendant.., or with any
other known 'VST' (Varrio Sureno Town or Varrio Sureno Treces) or 'VSL'
(Varrio Sureno Locos) member."' 99 In an opinion forcefully asserting a
community's right of self-defense,2°° the court upheld the challenged
injunction.
More specifically, Judge Brown asserted for the majority, in relevant part,
that the affiliations between gang members do not merit any recognizable First
Amendment protection;2"' that gang members could still "associate freely out
of public view" ;202 that given the gang's "hooligan-like" activities,0 3 a
complete ban on associations between gang members within the neighborhood
was justified, especially since gang members "engaged in no expressive or
speech-related activities which were not either criminally or civilly unlawful
or inextricably intertwined with unlawful conduct" ;2° and finally that
individualized proof of specific intent for each named defendant was not
196. See Rutkowski, supra note 14, at 142.
197. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 601.
198. 929 P.2d 596 (Cal. 1997).
199. Id. at 608.
200. See id. at 603; see also Wilson & Kelling, supra note 17, at 38 (arguing that communities, as
well as individuals, have rights of self-defense).
201. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 608-09.
202. Id. at 616.
203. Id. at 613.
204. Id. at 615.
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necessary where groups like gangs can act only through the medium of their
membership. 5
Gaertner and Dovidio's aversive racism framework is particularly useful
in analyzing Judge Brown's opinion. For example, in concluding his opinion,
Judge Brown noted:
To hold that the liberty of the peaceful, industrious residents of
Rocksprings must be forfeited to preserve the illusion of freedom for
those whose ill conduct is deleterious to the community as a whole is
to ignore half the political promise of the Constitution and the whole
of its sense .... Preserving the peace is the first duty of government,
and it is for the protection of the community from the predations of
the idle, the contentious, and the brutal that government was
invented.206
In this passage, Judge Brown lumped together violent gang members with
anyone who associates with them, regardless of whether these associates had
any intent to commit criminal actions. Moreover, he implicitly labeled this
group of people as "idle," "contentious," and "brutal" predators who are
engaged in a war against the government and all "peaceful, industrious"
people. True to the predictions of the aversive racism model, Justice Brown
advanced underlying racial arguments in "subtle, rationalizable ways"20, by
deracializing his argument. Conceivably, this would render his arguments
racially ambiguous enough to dismiss claims of racial bias.
Yet, as Judge Chin pointed out in his opinion dissenting in part, Blanca
Gonzalez, a named defendant, was enjoined for guilt by racial association
alone.208 The only pieces of evidence justifying an injunction against Ms.
Gonzalez were the facts that she had worn "a black top and black jeans"0 9
that fit police descriptions of gang members and that she had claimed gang
membership.10 Contrary to the rule of NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
205. See id. at 616-17.
206. Id. at 618 (emphases added).
207. Gaertner & Dovidio, supra note 133, at 62.
208. See Acuna, 929 P.2d at 620 (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The suspect
association in this case was to Latinos and Chicanos, groups who occupy the bottom of California's
socioeconomic ladder. See Pedro A. Noguera. Educational Rights and Latinos: Tracking as a Form of
Second Generation Discrimination, 8 LA RAZA LiJ. 25, 26-28 (1995); Kevin C. Wilson. Note, And Stay
Out! The Dangers of Using Anti-Immigrant Sentiment as a Basis for Social Policy: America Should Take
Heed of Disturbing Lessons from Great Britain's Past. 24 GA. J. INT''L & Co.tP. L 567. 579 (1995).
209. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 622 (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pan).
210. See id. In the words of Justice Mosk. the city validates as a criminal street gang "an association
of three or more persons with a common name or symbol whose members collectively or individually
engage in a pattern of criminal conduct." Id. at 623 n. I (Mosk. J.. dissenting). To validate gang
membership,
the City merely reviews police records to identify individuals who admit membership in a gang
to a peace officer, probation officer, juvenile hall or youth ranch employee, or who meet two
or more of the following conditions: wear clothing or tattoos indicating gang affiliation or use
gang hand signs; are named by two or more members of a gang as a member actively
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Co.,21 there was no evidence that Ms. Gonzalez "held a specific intent to
further [the gangs'] illegal aims."2 2 Based on the majority's criteria for
determining Sureno gang membership, "the City would consider a person to
be a member of a Sureno gang if, for example, that person wore baggy pants,
blue clothes, or 'Los Angeles Raiders' garments, '21 3 even though this
wardrobe might reflect the cultural garb of urban minority teenagers more
generally. Highlighting the subtle racial undertones of Justice Brown's opinion,
Justice Chin concluded, "Obviously, courts cannot enjoin all Mexican-
Americans because some Mexican-Americans contribute to the nuisance in
Rocksprings. Gang membership is no different, absent some evidence that




Gang violence should be addressed, and people should not be terrorized
in their neighborhoods. Nonetheless, hasty "emergency" measures like broad
civil injunctions designed to circumvent the "rule of law" are an unacceptable
means of pursuing this goal. Indeed, although not framed in the explicitly
racial terms of the postbellum Black Codes, anti-gang civil injunctions share
with those earlier laws the effect of stigmatizing minority communities and
maintaining white hegemony.
If civil injunctions are to provide any hope of abating violent gang activity,
they must be specifically targeted at people who have manifested the specific
intent to further the illegal activities of the gang and its criminal activities. A
contrary policy will only propel many disadvantaged minority youngsters into
the welcoming arms of gang leaders. Predicting the reaction of a sixteen-year-
old who has been swept up by the police for giving hand signals, Dr. Malcolm
W. Klein asks, "Does he say, 'Oh my goodness gracious. I have been
deterred,' or does he say, if you will pardon the language, 'Motherfuckers
couldn't hold the homey.' Of course, he says the latter., 21 5
Finally, the ultimate gang abatement solution is to improve the
socioeconomic conditions of inner-city communities. Inner-city "gangs" largely
serve as proxies for the extracurricular social organizations that are taken for
participate in a gang crime; are identified by a reliable informant as a gang member, or are
observed associating with gang members two or more times.
Id. Using these criteria, the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department estimated that 47% of all black men between
the ages of 21 and 24 were actual or suspected gang members. See id.
211. 458 U.S. 886, 920 (1982) ("Civil liability may not be imposed merely because an individual
belonged to a group, some members of which committed acts of violence.").
212. Id.
213. Acuna, 929 P.2d at 621 (Chin, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. Id.
215. Dr. Malcolm W. Klein, Street Gangs and the Juvenile Justice System in the 1990s, 23 PEPP. L.
REv. 860, 863 (1996).
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granted by middle-class American teenagers, but largely absent in
disadvantaged communities. Desperate people sometimes do desperate things.
And to the extent that inner-city youth have few social and economic
alternatives to gang membership, these youth may feel that there is no reason
why they should not discard the rules of a system that has largely discarded
them as "broken windows."

